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Abstract  
The executive – legislative relations in the Philippines have been described in two 
contrasting stories, namely the “strong president” story, and the “strong congress” 
story. This paper tries to consolidate the existing arguments and propose a new 
perspective focusing on the “compromise exchange” between the president and the 
congress across the different policy areas. It considers that the policy outcome is not 
brought by unilateral power of the president or the congress, but formed as the 
product of such an exchange. Interaction of powers and their complementary 
function are addressed. Furthermore, aside from the constitutional power, the weak 
party discipline is pointed out as a key factor in making the exchange possible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
From a comparative perspective, the presidential legislative power in the Philippines is 
at the middle level, in both constitutional and partisan powers (Shugart and Carey 1992, 
Haggard and McCubbins eds. 2001). This middle level strength raises some problems 
for researchers. Generally, it is more difficult to explain why it is neither weak nor 
strong than why it is weak or strong. It is also difficult to examine empirically. In 
conventional arguments in the studies on Philippine politics, however, there have been 
two contrasting views on the presidential power. One claims that the Philippine 
president is strong. This group focuses on the constitutional powers, and the 
administrative control over the bureaucracy (de Dios 1999, 2002). Another emphasizes 
the influence of dominant social class in the congress. This group claims that 
presidential legislative initiatives that undermine the social interests usually fail, due to 
the resistance of the congress (e.g. Abueva 2002).  
 
Both of them seem to describe the actual characteristics of the Philippine presidency, 
but not comprehensively. Instead of assuming that the policy outcome is a result of 
unilateral influence of the president or the congress, this paper proposes an alternative 
hypothesis that the policy outcome in the Philippines is a product of the “compromise 
exchange” between the president and the congress over the unconnected policy areas. 
Such an exchange is made possible when the superior player switches depending on the 
policy areas. In the Philippines, the president has the superior power in the budget 
process and policy implementation, while the congress dominates the legislative process 
of ordinary policies. Through offering compromises in the policy area where one is 
dominant, each player seeks concessions from the opponent in other areas where the 
opponent is dominant. This “compromise exchange”, deriving from the switch of 
dominant players in different areas, is made possible by the constitutional framework 
and weak party discipline.  
 
In the following section, we will deal with the theory of “compromise exchange”. Then, 
we will examine the theory in actual policy outcomes.  
 
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 
Form of Government and Party System in the Philippines 
The Philippines adopts a presidential system. The president monopolizes the executive 
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power and has the power to appoint secretaries of departments, who are not allowed to 
hold a seat in the legislature1. The power is strictly divided by the executive and the 
legislative branches. The legislature is bicameral, composed of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives. The Senate has 24 members elected from the national 
constituency, while the House has more than 200 members elected from single member 
districts and the limited proportional representation (the party list system).  
 
Table 1  President and Congress under the 1987 Constitution 
 The President The Senate The House of Representatives
Members 1 24 216 (SMD) + max 50 (PR)* 
Term six years six years three years 
Term Limit No reelection No three consecutive terms No four consecutive terms 
District National 
constituency 
National constituency Single member district (SMD) 
+ national constituency 
Method of 
Election 
Plural  Plural by bloc voting (12 
names), change half of the 
members every three years 
Plural + Limited proportional 
representation (max three seats 
for each party) 
* As of November, 2008. Actual number of the PR representatives is 22. 
Source: Author. 
 
Regarding the local governance, the Philippines has a unilateral system, instead of a 
federal system. Aside from local governments which are headed by elected local chief 
executives and local councils, the central government maintains local offices for 
respective departments.  
 
As for the party system, the Philippines had the two-party system of the Nacionalista 
Party and the Liberal Party, after its independence in 1946 until the declaration of 
martial law in 1972. After the democratization in 1986, the number of parties increased 
drastically, and there is no stable dominant party (Kasuya 2008). Actually, a party is 
formed by an individual presidential candidate every election time. In the first place, 
there are some leading presidential candidates. They are usually senators, cabinet 
secretaries or vice presidents. They decide whether they will use the existing parties for 
                                                 
1 But, the consent of the Committee on Appointment composed of the members of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives is required to finalize the appointments.  
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their campaign or establish new ones. That is the party formation at the initial stage. 
When the winner is decided, the party system goes through reorganization. 
Reorganization is driven as party switching to or coalition formation with the 
president’s party. Politicians change their affiliations, and some parties disappear. Since 
the parties are short term groupings of politicians, they are not cohesive. In recent years, 
left leaning parties supported by labor unions and peasant groups have gained some 
seats in the lower house through the proportional representation (the party list system), 
and this opens up opportunities for cohesive parties to appear. Such cohesive parties, 
however, have little chance to become dominant in the congress, since each party is 
allowed to hold a maximum three seats under the current law. 
 
Political parties are not expected to play key roles in policy making as they are very 
fluid. The key players in policy making in the Philippines are institutional players 
defined by the constitution, namely, the president, the senate and the House of 
Representatives2. 
 
Preferences of the Players 
Assuming that political players seek to hold and maintain the power, three institutional 
players have different incentives defined by the respective method of election.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Eaton (2002) explained the policy process in the Philippines through the election 
system and preferences of these institutional players. MacIntyre (2001) also discuses 
policy outcomes based on these three institutional players. 
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Table 2  Institutional Players and Expected Behavior 
Player Method of Election Expected Behavior 
President Plural in national constituency.
No reelection. 
The presidency is the final point of a political 
career in the Philippines. But the president 
may be apprehensive about being ousted in 
the midst of his term. The president is also 
concerned with policy performance at the 
national level, like fiscal discipline and 
stability of the macro economy. The 
president tends to consider the problem in the 
short term as he can stay in the position for 
six years only. 
Senate Plural by bloc voting (12 
names) in national 
constituency. 
No three consecutive terms. 
Senators can still further their careers to 
cabinet posts, the vice presidency and the 
presidency. They can also continue their 
careers by keeping their current positions. 
Senators pay much attention to their images 
in the media for nationwide popularity. Each 
senator acts independently. Formation of the 
majority is fluid.  
House of 
Representatives 
(SMD) 
Plural in single member 
districts. 
No four consecutive terms. 
Representatives seek to establish and 
strengthen their power base at their local 
bailiwicks. They try to maximize the pork 
barrel distributions in order to secure 
personal votes. Representatives, supported by 
their own local political machine, have little 
incentive to rely on political parties for 
elections.  
Source: Author. 
 
For the president, the current post is the final point of his political career. The next 
election, therefore, generally does not affect the behavior in the current term3. The 
                                                 
3 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was able to run for the presidential election in 
2004, because she assumed the presidency as vice president after President Joseph 
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president may give an “anointment” to a certain candidate as his successor. It is possible 
for the president to support the “anointed” candidate during an election campaign, 
expecting the candidate will play the role of the incumbent’s alter ego. This “anointment” 
is expected to bring reelection incentive. Such an “anointment”, however, does not work 
to bind the successor for the predecessor’s interest protection, because there is no means 
to secure the commitment of the successor. In this situation, an “anointment” usually 
does not prepare the reelection incentive for the president. The president is forced to be 
free from reelection incentive and seeks policy stability during his term to stabilize his 
current power. For this purpose, the president gives much attention to legislations for 
fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability. Additionally, the president calculates his 
payoffs in a relatively short time frame, as his term is limited to six years. The president, 
therefore, is expected to prefer ad hoc solutions for policy problems or just to put off the 
necessary actions, instead of adopting long term strategies for fundamental solutions.  
 
On the other hand, the senators have the reelection incentive. Although the constitution 
prohibits three consecutive terms for the senators, they can shift to the executive posts, 
the House of Representatives, or other elective offices. The term limit has little 
influence on the senators’ behavior. Against its rival institutional players, the senate 
usually tries to contain the House of Representatives that seek maximization of pork 
barrel, and to resist legislations that expand the presidential discretions. Another 
important feature is that the senators have the incentive to promote their own personal 
political career against their colleagues. The senators are actually each others’ 
competitors, because they are elected in the national constituency with 12 names in bloc 
voting. Candidates need to get in the top 12 to win the election. In this setting, the 
senators have less incentive to pursue collective interests.  
 
The members of the House of Representatives also face a constitutional limit on their 
term (no four consecutive terms), but they can shift to provincial governors or can 
position members of own families to take care of the posts in their absence. The 
representatives keep the incentive to secure personal votes in such a situation (Cain et 
al., 1987). The term limits, therefore, do not influence their behavior. Based on the 
reelection incentive and the different methods of election, the representatives have 
                                                                                                                                               
Estrada stepped down in the midst of his term. This case is exceptional under the 1987 
constitution. 
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different preferences from those of the president and the senate.  
 
The single member district is generally considered to be more conducive to strong party 
discipline than the multi-member district. The case of the Philippines, however, does not 
seem to fit the pattern. The main reason is that nomination of a political party does not 
influence the result of elections. It is true that the affiliation with a party contributes to a 
candidate’s campaign because a party helps a candidate in voting, counting monitoring 
and finance. But, it is not crucial in deciding the fate of a candidate. A candidate 
depends on each local political machine which is developed not by parties but through 
the personal or family capacity (Kawanaka 2002).  
 
The representatives do not need to compete with their colleagues in the House unlike 
the senators, because most of them are elected from the single member districts. The 
representatives, rather, share the incentive to maximize the collective interest of the 
House, which is the increase of pork barrel distribution. For the collective action, they, 
of course, face the collective action problem (Olson 1965). In addition, even if they do 
not need to compete in the elections, the representatives are expected to compete for the 
lucrative posts in the House. The House of Representatives formed a system to mitigate 
these problems, by means of giving relatively strong power to the Speaker of the House, 
not through political parties4.  
 
Explaining Policy Outcome 
The policy process in the Philippines is characterized by the interaction of these three 
institutional players who have different preferences. To simplify the logic, we do not 
                                                 
4 The Speaker of the House holds the following powers for mitigating the collective 
action problem and intra-House competitions. First, the Speaker appoints the chairs of 
committees. Second, the Speaker appoints the members of the bicameral conference 
committee, which negotiate with the senate counterpart on the conflicting issues in 
legislations. Third, the Speaker has the rights to speak and vote at all committees. 
Fourth, the Speaker holds the power to supervise and intervene in the management of 
committees through regular meetings with chairs and vice chairs. Fifth, the Speaker can 
influence the allotment of bills to committees through the Committee on Rules. Finally, 
the Speaker decides the schedule of session and priority issues. In addition, pork barrel 
distribution rarely creates competition among the House members, because the amount 
of the pork barrel allocation to each legislator is decided uniformly, and the actual 
release is negotiated between the president and the House leaders, or between the 
Department of Budget and Management and individual representatives, but not among 
the representatives.  
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distinguish between the senate and the House here. Instead, we treat the congress as one. 
The currently dominant arguments can be classified into the following two. 
 
One is the “strong president” story. This view thinks that the policy process is 
dominated by the president who holds formal and informal superior power. The 
president actually holds strong constitutional power and has large discretions over the 
implementation of policies. The bureaucracy is also fully placed under the president’s 
control. Such a strong presidential power is often used for explaining inconsistency of 
policies in the Philippines. This view claims that policies are changed every six years 
when the president changes. This argument further asserts that the Philippines has a 
barrier to further economic growth due to this policy instability (de Dios and Esfahani 
2001).  
 
The other is the “strong congress” story. This view emphasizes that the policy process is 
dominated by the congress. It does not mean that the congress takes policy initiatives. 
Instead, it asserts that the status quo is generally maintained due to the veto power of the 
congress. The “strong congress” story fits the argument of dominant social class. They 
explain that the dominant social class controls the congress, and such a class prevents 
the reforms which bring damages to the class interests. As typical cases, the scholars 
point out the failures of the land reform and the tax reform. The argument on the shift 
from the presidential system to the parliamentary system is developed based on this 
perspective. That is to say, gridlock in policy making often takes place in the Philippines 
due to the veto power of the legislature, and this obstructs the reforms conducive to 
economic growth.  
 
The “strong president” and the “strong congress” stories are contradictory in their logic, 
but, both stories describe correctly certain aspects of the actual executive – legislative 
relations in the Philippines. It would be more comprehensive and precise if we suppose 
that there are two types of policy area. In some areas, the president is dominant, while in 
other areas, the congress controls the process. And actual policy outcome is made 
through the “compromise exchange” over the different policy areas. For this purpose, 
we can classify three policy areas, which are ordinary legislation, budget making and 
implementation, and ordinary policy implementation. 
 
The congress is dominant in general legislation, because the president has no power to 
7 
 
introduce bills or intervene in the session. Moreover, the president is only given the 
package veto power, but not the partial veto. The degree of presidential intervention is 
limited.  
 
On the other hand, the president can control the budget making and implementation. 
First, the president has the exclusive power to introduce the budget proposal to the 
congress. Second, the congress is not allowed to amend the budget proposal to exceed 
the total amount of the presidential proposal. Third, the president can exercise the 
partial veto aside from the package veto on the budget bill approved by the congress. 
The partial veto allows the president to amend the budget virtually at the final stage. 
Finally, the Presidential Decree No. 1177, which provides automatic appropriation of 
the expenditure for the debt service, augments the presidential power5. The congress, 
especially the House of Representatives, seeks to increase the allocation of pork barrel 
funds within the ceiling imposed by the president. The target for additional funds is 
always the debt service. The congress underestimates the debt repayment and attempts 
to take away its funds for pork barrel items. The ban on the amendment of the debt 
service causes difficulty for the congress in securing additional sources for fund 
transfers. In addition to these powers in the budget making process, the president also 
has the power to change the budget at the implementation phase. Actual fund release is 
controlled by the president through the Department of Budget and Management. The 
congress occasionally tries to insert the rules to provide the congress with the authority 
over the fund release, but these rules are deleted by the presidential veto.  
 
As for the ordinary policy implementation, the president monopolizes the power. The 
regulatory power is under the sole jurisdiction of the president. The president issues 
executive orders for this purpose under the mandate of the statutes.  
 
The president’s legislative powers are listed in Table 3. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The Presidential Decree No. 1177 was enacted by President Ferdinand Marcos under 
his authoritarian rule. The decree has statutory effects. The decree can be amended or 
repealed in the same procedure for ordinary statutes. To date, however, the decree has 
not been amended or repealed. 
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Table 3  Legislative Power of the President 
Power Yes or No 
Package Veto (Reactive) Yes (Override by 2/3 of the congress) 
Partial Veto (Reactive) Yes (Only for budget and tax measures) 
Decree (Proactive) No (Executive orders within the mandate of 
statutes) 
Exclusive Introduction of Bills (Proactive) No (Except for budget proposals) 
Budget Enactment (Proactive) Yes (Exclusive introduction and ceiling) 
Referendum No 
Dissolving the congress No 
(Source) Author. 
 
Bargaining arises due to the reverse power balance between the president and the 
congress in the ordinary legislation, the budget making/implementation and the ordinary 
policy implementation. As a precondition for bargaining, the president and the congress 
need to have different preferences in each area. In the general legislation, the congress 
usually prefers the status quo, while the president prefers to leave the status quo, 
especially in economic issues. In contrast, for the budget process, the president prefers 
to restrain the expenditure, while the congress, particularly the House of 
Representatives, prefers to obtain more allotment for their local projects, which 
eventually leads to expansion of the expenditure.  
 
Since the ordinary legislation is technically independent of the budget process and 
policy implementation, the decision making seems to proceed as if they are not related. 
The compromises, nonetheless, are made and exchanged across the different areas, and 
such bargaining as a whole decides the final outcome.  
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Figure 1  Interaction between Two Policy Areas 
 
Compromise 
Outcome The President The Congress 
Budget Process 
Compromise 
Outcome The President The Congress 
General Legislation 
(Source) Author. 
 
The president provides compromises in the budget process in order to obtain the 
compromise from the congress in the ordinary legislation. The congress cooperates with 
the president on the legislation of the president’s initiative, to gain the further allocation 
in the budget. Figure 1 shows this type of interaction across the different areas. If the 
ordinary legislation is independent of other policy areas, the congress can easily realize 
its preference. In the same way, if the budget process is decided without any connection 
to other areas, the president’s ideal point would be the final outcome. In the actual 
process, the final outcomes in the respective areas are brought relatively closer to the 
rival’s ideal point. We can say that this pattern is made possible by the interaction 
between the compromises across the different areas.   
 
As we have seen, the president has no power to propose a bill at the congress. But he 
can allow his allies in the congress to file a bill, and certify it as an administration 
certified bill or priority bill for fast enactment. On the other hand, the congress desires 
increase and fast release of pork barrel funds. In this situation, enactment of the 
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president’s priority bills and allocation/release of pork barrel funds are expected to be 
interconnected.  
 
In fact, the local media often reports that the president releases the pork barrel funds to 
have his priority bills approved by the congress. In this sense, the “compromise 
exchange” is not a new finding. Nonetheless, the exchange of the budget allocation and 
legislation of priority bills are usually discussed in the context of the “strong president” 
story. The president is perceived to be able to control the congress through budget 
management. But, emphasis on the president’s control is one sided, because the 
president is also pressured to give some concessions to the congress in both the 
legislation and budget process. This could be interpreted as the congress exercising its 
influence through its veto power in legislation.  
 
Importantly, the weak party discipline is the precondition which makes the 
“compromise exchange” possible. Strong party discipline sometimes strengthens the 
president’s control over the congress, because the president is usually the leader of the 
dominant party. But, at the same time, the opposition also becomes cohesive. If the 
congress is dominated by the opposition, the divided government emerges. If the party 
discipline is weak, the president may have a chance to let the opposition members shift 
their affiliation or at least to cooperate with his policy initiatives through negotiation.  
 
For example, in the 12th congress (2001-2004), the Speaker of the House who was close 
to the president was supported by 91.8 percent of the total members of the House in the 
election of the speakership. Also in the 13th congress (2004-2007), the president’s ally 
was supported as the Speaker by 80.9 percent of the total members. When we look at 
this pattern, we can say that it is less possible to have a divided government in the 
Philippines after 1986. The president usually has collaborative relations with the 
majority of the House. Nonetheless, such an ad hoc coalition may be costly to the 
president, because the president needs to provide resources to the congress every time 
an important issue is on the agenda.  
 
To examine the theory above, we will take a look at the legislative performance and 
budget distribution in the next section.  
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EXAMINING POLICY OUTCOMES 
Legislative Performance 
If the “compromise exchange” enables the president to legislate his preferred policies, 
the enactment rate of the president’s priority bills becomes higher than without such 
exchanges. The ideal examination method is to compare the enactment rate of the 
president’s priority bill with the “compromise exchange” and that without the exchange. 
This is actually impossible because we cannot control the “compromise exchange.” We, 
therefore, compare the enactment rates of the president’s priority bills and those of 
ordinary bills assuming that ordinary bills are not supported by the “compromise 
exchange”.  
 
Table 4 indicates the enactment rates in the post-democratization congress (1987-2004).  
 
Table 4  Enactment Rates at the House of Representatives 
Congress/Administration National 
Application 
Enactment 
Rate 
Local 
Application 
Enactment 
Rate 
8th / Aquino (1987-1992) 191/5,237 3.6% 809/30,183 2.7%
9th / Ramos (1992-1995) 156/3,184 4.9% 306/11,448 2.7%
10th / Ramos (1995-1998) 147/3,785 3.9% 393/6,766 5.8%
11th / Estrada (1998-2001) 67/4,197 1.6% 348/8,738 4.9%
12th / Arroyo (2001-2004) 89/2,920 3.0% 84/3,764 2.2%
Total 650/19,323 3.4% 1,940/60,899 3.2%
(Source) The House of Representatives. 
 
On average, the enactment rate of national application bills is 3.4 percent, while that of 
local application bills is 3.2 percent6. Bills hardly survive.7  
 
                                                 
6 National application bills are applied nationwide. Economic reform bills are included 
in this category. On the other hand, local application bills are applied limitedly to certain 
areas. These are, for example, bills for specific facilities.  
7 In addition, the rates of presidential veto against the bills are: 3.9 percent in the 8th 
congress, 8.0 percent in the 9th congress, 3.1 percent in the 10th congress and 4.8 percent 
in the 11th congress. These figures include the partial vetoes against the general 
appropriation acts. We can observe the tendency that the veto is more exercised against 
local application bills.  
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Compared with these average rates, the president’s priority bills are enacted at higher 
rates. Table 5 shows the data on the president’s priority bills in the 8th and the 12th 
congresses. 
Table 5 Enactment Rates of President’s Bills at the House of Representatives 
Congress / 
Administration 
President’s Priority 
Bills 
Enacted Bills among 
President’s Priority 
Bills 
Enactment Rate
8th / Aquino 93 54 58.1%
12th / Arroyo 20 8 40.0%
(Source) The House of Representatives 
 
Since not all the president’s priority bills are approved by the House, it seems that the 
president’s influence over the congress is not perfect. But, considering the legislation 
results, it is possible to say that the president’s policy initiatives are relatively supported 
by the House.  
 
Here is a problem in measurement. The enactment rate does not completely indicate 
how the president’s preference is realized in legislation. If the congress imposes 
essential amendments to the bills, the president’s policy plan may be virtually scrapped.  
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Figure 2  Two Tax Reforms and Tax Effort 
 
* Tax effort here means the ratio of tax revenue to nominal GDP. The left vertical axis 
indicates the tax effort, while the right vertical axis shows the real GDP growth rate. 
(Source) Department of Budget and Management, National Economic and Development 
Agency. 
 
Tax reforms are often discussed regarding legislative “distortion” on the president’s 
initiative. The Philippines had two major tax reforms after the democratization. One was 
introduced under the Aquino administration in 1986 just after the democratization. At 
that time, the congress was not yet convened, and the reform was brought by the 
presidential power only, through the executive order. Another reform was enacted under 
the Ramos administration in 1997. This second tax reform needed to go through the 
ordinary legislative process at the congress. Figure 2 shows the ratio of tax revenue to 
the nominal GDP (tax effort). This figure casts a simple picture that the tax effort 
increased after the first tax reform under the Aquino administration, but declined after 
the reform under the Ramos administration. In other words, when there was no 
congressional intervention, tax effort went up. But tax effort went down when there was 
an intervention. Although tax reform is not the sole cause for fluctuation of tax effort, it 
14 
 
is still a major factor. It is natural to assume both President Aquino and President Ramos 
had the same goal for the tax reforms, which is revenue expansion. Based on this 
assumption, it is plausible to say that the effects of tax reforms are affected by the 
congress that prefers a lower tax rate. The president was forced to give concession even 
though he could enact the tax reform.  
 
From the number of enacted bills, we find that the congress gives concession to the 
president. But we need to examine the content of the enacted bill to check how much 
the bills were modified. In this sense, we still do not know completely if the congress 
really made compromises to the president. 
 
Budget Control 
The outcome of the budget process shows a different trend as compared with ordinary 
legislative processes. Table 6 shows the comparison of the presidential budget proposals 
and the enacted budgets from 1995 to 2005.  
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Table 6  Presidential Proposals and Final Budgets 
Fiscal 
Year 
Total Amounts of the 
Presidential Budget 
Proposals 
Enacted 
Budgets 
Changes（％） The Ratio of 
Government 
Expenditure to GDP 
as of Session for 
Budget（％） 
1995 390.9 382.2 -2.25 +1.0
1996 404.5 394.4 -2.50 +0.6
1997 476.2 493.4 +3.61 +0.3
1998 540.8 565.3 +4.53 +0.1
1999 579.5 579.5 0.00 -1.9
2000 650.0 629.0 -3.23 -3.8
2001 725.0 Not enacted *** -4.0
2002 780.8 780.8 0.00 -4.0
2003 804.2 804.0 -0.02 -5.4
2004 864.8 Not enacted *** -4.6
2005 907.6 907.6 0.00 -3.8
* 1 billion pesos. 
(Source) Author, based on the Business World articles in CODEX. 
 
This table indicates that the ceiling imposed by the president is strictly maintained if the 
current fiscal balance worsens. But, the ceiling is broken if the budget has surplus. As 
mentioned above, the constitution prohibits the budget bill amendments to increase the 
total amount over the presidential proposal. The presidential ceiling was, nonetheless, 
neglected twice under the Ramos administration. This happened as a result of the 
combination of automatic appropriation of the debt service and the presidential partial 
veto. In these two years, the congress projected optimistic economic performance and 
estimated the reduction of debt service based on the favorable exchange rate. The 
congress, then, transferred funds from the debt service to local projects, and increased 
the funds allocation which they preferred. This move was not considered unlawful since 
the total amount of revised budget did not exceed the presidential proposal at this point. 
The president, however, exercised partial veto on the debt service after the congress 
passed the bill. The initial amount based on the automatic appropriation scheme was 
revived, and pushed up the total amount over the ceiling (Gutierrez 1998).  
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The budget surplus forms the background to this “trick” to make the budget expand. 
The president did not strongly intend to prevent this “trick” under the good fiscal 
condition. In this sense, such budget expansion was the president’s compromise to the 
congress. But as the budget condition worsened and the president could not tolerate the 
budget deficit, the ceiling was strictly imposed. Supported by the constitutional 
provision, control over the total amount seems to work well.  
 
The congress sabotages the session when the president controls the budget process. The 
budget was not enacted sometimes, or the process was terribly delayed. The president, 
hence, is not free to control the budget making. Especially, the president has difficulties 
in abolishing or slashing the pork barrel funds, because such an act causes serious 
damages to the members of the congress. The representatives, in particular, resist the 
reduction of pork barrel allocation. The failure of President Estrada’s attempt to abolish 
the pork barrel was a typical case of the strong resistance from the congress. 
 
President Estrada promised, during his campaigning for the 1998 presidential election, 
that he would totally abolish the pork barrel funds. As he promised, he did not include 
items for the pork barrel in the 1999 fiscal year budget proposal. But, ultimately, 
President Estrada was forced to compromise and approved the budget amendments to 
revive pork barrel. In the following year, President Estrada tried to impose constraints 
over the areas where pork barrel funds could be used. Moreover, the President did not 
allow fast release of pork barrel funds in the running appropriation. Such constraints 
and delay in release triggered again the protest of the House of Representatives. The 
President finally exercised partial vetoes on 52 items of the congress approved budget. 
Again, for the 2001 budget, the delayed release of pork barrel funds incurred anti 
president sentiment in the House of Representatives, and this eventually stopped the 
session. The congress, at that time, was busy with the impeachment trial against 
President Estrada, and could not enact the appropriation act.  
 
In sum, the president’s constitutional power over budget making basically works for 
fiscal discipline. But, as the deficit becomes serious, the president has less room for 
compromise to the congress. The president and the congress also face serious conflict in 
the budget making process. Gridlock in policy making may also take place, because the 
president loses the bargaining power in ordinary legislation.  
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Institutions for Interest Coordination and Pork Barrel Politics 
In order to facilitate the “compromise exchange” between the president and the congress 
across the different areas, they need a place for negotiation. This is the institutions for 
interest coordination. The Legislative Executive Development Advisory Council 
(LEDAC) and the Presidential Legislative Liaison Office (PLLO) function for this 
purpose8. The LEDAC is the place where the president, cabinet secretaries and leaders 
of the congress meet together and discuss the legislative agenda. The PLLO, on the 
other hand, is a part of the Office of the President. The PLLO has offices at the senate 
and the House, and lobbies the legislature on a daily basis for passage of the president’s 
priority bills.  
 
These institutions for interest coordination among institutional players play a crucial 
role where political parties are less cohesive and do not work for interest aggregation. 
The interest coordination is backed by the pork barrel funds. The origin of the pork 
barrel funds after the democratization was regional development funds under the 
Aquino administration. These funds are reorganized into two types under the Arroyo 
administration, namely the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and the 
funds under the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Each member of 
the congress (senator and representative) is given a fixed amount of allocation. Table 7 
summarizes the pork barrel funds in 2002 and 2003 budgets. 
 
Table 7 Pork Barrel Funds in 2002 and 2003 Budgets 
 PDAF DPWH Total 
2002 Amount of Pork Barrel  
(Share in Total) 
4,979 13,886 
(29.1%) 
18,864
(2.5%)
Total 47,632 742,022
2003 Amount of Pork Barrel  
(Share in Total) 
6,168 13,387 
(25.1%) 
19,555
(2.4%)
Total  53,312 825,113
(Source) Department of Budget and Management. 
 
                                                 
8 Additionally, the Bicameral Conference Committee is also important for coordination 
between the senate and the House of Representatives. 
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Each congressman identifies the projects that he wants to implement. After such 
identification, the departments concerned will work on them. For fund release, the 
Department of Budget and Management issues the permit for fund release considering 
the condition of the national coffers. Although the budget and management secretary 
has jurisdiction over the permit issuance, the president can influence the release through 
the budget and management secretary, reflecting on the issues in the legislative process.  
 
Measuring the “compromise exchange”, nonetheless, is difficult either quantitatively or 
qualitatively. Checking the correlation between the pork barrel fund release and 
legislators’ behavior (e.g. voting in the session for the president’s priority bills) seems 
an appropriate examination for such exchange. Unfortunately, the data on roll call vote, 
which is considered to indicate the legislators’ behavior, does not reflect the exchange 
precisely, at least, in the Philippines. Furthermore, the compromises are exchanged not 
only between the pork barrel and the passage of bills, but also through other issues. 
Considering such conditions, it seems difficult to present significant correlation9. The 
local media, however, often reports the bargaining between the president and the 
congress through pork barrel distribution, and the probability of “compromise exchange” 
is quite high. For example, Gutierrez (1998: 77-79) reports that the congress approved 
the 1994 expanded value added tax reform on the condition that the president releases 
the funds of the Congressional Initiative Allocation (CIA), which is also pork barrel. I 
also confirmed the bargaining through pork barrel in my interview with an official in the 
congressional secretariat10.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In general, the presidential legislative power in the Philippines is at the middle level. 
But if we take a closer look at the power, we find “compromise exchange” deriving 
from the structure in which the superior player changes depending on the policy areas. 
The “compromise exchange” forms the policy outcomes in the Philippines. This is the 
key in this paper. As a precondition, it is important that the political parties are less 
cohesive in the Philippines. It enables the president to placate the opposition in the 
congress, and it eventually prevents a rigid divided government.  
                                                 
9 Kawanaka (2008) tries to test the correlation, but does not find evidence to support 
such correlation directly.  
10 In the interview, it was also mentioned that the timing of fund release was important, 
in addition to the amount.  
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Such a weak party system is formed through the situation that political candidates win 
the elections by means of their personal votes instead of the party support. Each 
candidate can secure his political machine because his respective bailiwick is 
geographically limited in the single member district. The presidential system also 
weakens the party as the election of the executive is separated from those of the 
legislature. When we consider the preference of the House of Representatives, the 
representatives share the same preference among their colleagues, but not with the 
president even if he is the party leader. On the other hand, the opposition party faces the 
same problem of weak discipline. The members of the opposition easily shift their 
position depending on the concessions which the president provides. If we suppose a 
counterfactual whereby the political parties were more cohesive in the Philippines, the 
expected result would be that the president’s party and the opposition tend to have rigid 
conflict and a divided government emerges more often. The president would have 
difficulty in appeasing the opposition and making them collaborate with his policy 
initiative. In short, weak political parties are one of the main causes of this 
“compromise exchange.” 
 
Considering the “compromise exchange,” the case of the Philippines implies that the 
interaction of the power of each player should be taken into account in addition to 
measuring the strength of the power itself. How do the presidential powers in different 
areas complement each other? How do the partisan powers affect the constitutional 
design? Is there an endogenous mechanism between the constitutional and partisan 
powers? These are future prospective research questions.  
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